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The failure of the economy to grow and create enough jobs gave way to an "interrogation of the compatibility between GEAR and the labor legislation and a growing concern with rising unemployment and poverty" (Leibbrandt et al. 2001, 16) . The government stated its commitment to GEAR again at the Presidential Jobs Summit in 1998, which brought together government, organized labor, and the business sector. Despite consensus on the need for occupational training and job creations schemes, significant changes in labor market legislation did not follow. Nor did any significant land reform materialize, although it was identified as a source of improvement for long-term employment and rural income growth.
The narrow unemployment rate increased from 17% to 24% between 1995 and 1999, while the broad unemployment rate, which includes the so-called discouraged workers, increased from 29% to 38% (Klasen and Woolard 2000) . During the same time period, the demand for high-skilled labor increased, while it declined for low-skilled labor, a trend that Rama (2001) relates (to some extent) to trade liberalization. Rama (2001) also reports a tendency toward outsourcing in the manufacturing sector, which led to an increase of workers in the informal sector between 1995 and 2000. Bhorat (2003) reports that the expansion of the informal sector accounted for 84% of the 1.1 million jobs created for 1996-99. However, the labor force expanded by 3.1 million over the same period, causing the increase in the rate of unemployment. Employers in manufacturing perceived labor market regulations as a major hindrance to hiring workers (Rama 2001; Economist 2004) .
South Africa has a highly segmented labor market, where the high-skill tier is characterized by excess demand (Rama 2001) , while the low-skill tier displays large excess supply. 8 Unemployment is very high in rural areas, highlighting not only the lack of economic activity in former homelands, but also the fact that unemployed individuals stay in or move back to rural areas to attach themselves to households with adequate public or private support (Klasen and Woolard 2000) . Under these circumstances, one would expect an increase in inequality due to rising incomes for a small group of educated and skilled South Africans and stagnant or declining incomes for a much larger group of low-skilled individuals. 9 Given this backdrop of very high levels of poverty and inequality in what is essentially an upper-middle-income country, knowledge of what happened to the national distribution of household expenditures since the end of apartheid is important but somewhat inadequate. 10 Various studies using the panel data generated by the Kwazulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS), report on changes in welfare in Kwazulu-Natal, a large province of South Africa that is home to roughly one-fifth of the population. Carter and May (2001) find that poverty rates among the nonwhite population in Kwazulu-Natal increased from 27% to 43% between 1993 and 1998. Furthermore, they find that approximately 70% of the poor may be dynamically so, unable to escape poverty during that period. Using the same data source, but utilizing income data instead of expenditures, Fields et al. (2003) do not present any figures on absolute poverty but report that the Gini coefficient increased from 0.515 to 0.543 in Kwazulu-Natal. Also using income data from the same data sources used in this article (1995 and 2000 Income Expenditure Surveys, or IES) , Leibbrandt, Levinsohn, and McCrary (2005) find that real individual incomes deteriorated substantially for South Africans, with the starkest change reported for the bottom half of the distribution.
In this article, I build on the literature before us to describe changes in real mean household expenditure, poverty, and inequality across all of South Africa and for various subgroups of the population for 1995-2000. To perform this analysis, I make two modest contributions. First, I utilize consumption aggregates in both the 1995 and 2000 IES that are carefully built so as to be as comparable to each other as possible. Second, using price data for each food item collected in the monthly consumer price surveys conducted by Statistics South Africa (STATS SA), I not only construct provincial and intertemporal price indexes but also draw normative (lower-bound and upper-bound) poverty lines to assess poverty in South Africa using the "cost-of-basic-needs" approach.
I find that the annual per capita growth rate of household expenditures between 1995 and 2000 is 0.5%-very much in line with the GDP growth and the growth of final consumption expenditure by households from the national accounts data.
11 Consistent with Leibbrandt et al. (2005) , but much less pronounced, I find a deterioration of expenditures at the bottom end of the distribution.
12 Distribution-sensitive measures of poverty increased sig- 10 According to the International Comparison Programme database (World Bank), the purchasing power parity-adjusted GDP per capita for South Africa (in current international $) was $8,642 in 1995 and $9,580 in 2000. 11 According to the household survey data, per capita household expenditures went from R534 in 1995 to R547 in 2000. However, this annual increase of 0.5% is not statistically significant. 12 Please see Sec. IV for more on a comparison of the findings in this study and those in Leibbrandt et al. (2005) .
nificantly for a large range of poverty lines, while the headcount index remained unchanged for the entire range between the lower-bound (R322) and upperbound (R593) poverty lines (per capita per month in 2000 prices). 13 These changes were not uniform across the country. Coloureds made significant gains against poverty over this period, and so did several provinces, namely, Western Cape, Northern Cape, and Free State. Changes in overall inequality were mostly negligible, but there was a significant increase among the African population. The fact that the growth rate was low and that the materialized growth was not pro-poor were the main reasons for the lack of progress against poverty in this period. It is sobering to note that, in what is considered an uppermiddle-income country, more than one in three individuals lived with less than just $2/day (R174 per capita per month in 2000 prices) in 2000, a significant increase from 1995 that translates into roughly 2.3 million additional individuals in poverty. 14 The next section briefly discusses the data and methodology, while Section III presents the changes in poverty and inequality in South Africa, and provides breakdowns by population group and province. Section IV discusses the sensitivity of the results with respect to the assumptions on sampling weights, the importance of home-grown food consumption, and urban/rural price differentials and argues that the findings of this article are in agreement with those from other data sources that can shed light on distributional shifts during this period. Section V discusses some remaining puzzles and concludes the article.
II. Data and Methodology
In constructing household consumption aggregates to analyze changes over time in South Africa, I followed standard practice, in particular the guidelines put forth by Deaton and Zaidi (2002) , Lanjouw, Prennushi, and Zaidi (1996) , 13 In the past 30 years, there has been a large literature on the choice of poverty measure. Among the Foster-Greer Thorbecke indexes, there is no a priori reason to focus on one versus another. However, Sen (1976, 295) called into question the widespread use of the headcount index, calling the degree of support commanded by this measure "quite astonishing," while Watts (1968, 326) said that "it had little but its simplicity to recommend it." The obvious objection to the headcount index is that it gives no indication of the depth or severity of poverty. For a longer discussion of the subject, see Atkinson (1998, sec. 1.4 ). 14 The oft-used international $1/day and $2/day poverty lines are admittedly much lower than the range of poverty lines that I derive and deem relevant for the South African poverty debate at hand. However, that more than one-third of the population in 2000 was living below such a low poverty line for South Africa seems worth mentioning here.
and Ravallion (2001) . 15 Below, I discuss in some detail the data the construction and comparability of the consumption aggregates, the calculation of normative lower-bound and upper-bound poverty lines, and the spatial and intertemporal price adjustments. I also discuss the deviations I had to make from standard practice-mainly due to data constraints-that may affect my welfare estimates.
A. Data
The data utilized in this article come from two surveys, each of which was conducted by STATS SA in both 1995 and 2000. The first is the October Household Survey (OHS), which is taken annually. The second is the Income and Expenditure Survey (IES), which is held every 5 years among households surveyed by the OHS. Combined, these surveys provide information on household income and expenditure, along with information on other household characteristics, such as demographics, work, access to services, and housing characteristics for roughly 30,000 households in each of the survey years. Recently the annual OHS was transformed into a biannual Labor Force Survey (LFS) with a rotating panel. I utilize OHS 1995 , IES 1995 , and LFS 2000 The data I utilize to transform nominal household expenditures into real expenditures come from the consumer price surveys that STATS SA conducts on a monthly basis. The consumer price survey is conducted to collect information for the production of the monthly consumer price index (CPI) using a reference set of goods and services called the CPI basket. The basket and weights are redesigned every 5 years using the IES. The coverage of the CPI was increased from January 1997 to cover 14 metropolitan areas and 39 other urban areas throughout all nine provinces of South Africa. 17 The CPI is published on a monthly basis.
B. Building Blocks of the Consumption Aggregate
The income and expenditure modules in the IES hardly changed between 1995 and 2000, and, hence, it is possible to build comparable consumption aggre- 15 The literature on the choice of income vs. expenditure to measure household welfare is well established, and I abstract from that debate here. I believe, for empirical and theoretical reasons, that using data on household expenditures is preferable to using data on incomes. 16 IES data from both years were trimmed by dropping the top and bottom 1% of the observations by the per capita food expenditure of households. While merging the IES and OHS in 1995 I lost 51 observations (less than a quarter of 1% of the total number of observations in 1995). I had to drop 245 observations (less than 1% of the total number of observations in 2000) due to duplicate observations, mismatches in merging the IES and LFS, and other routine data cleaning. 17 Table A2 in the appendix details the consumer price survey sites throughout the nine provinces of South Africa.
gates based on a large set of common items that are included in both the 1995 and 2000 data. 18 The consumption aggregate includes the following expenditure categories: food (excluding home-grown), beverages, and cigarettes; housing (imputed rental value of residence and utilities); compensation for domestic workers; personal care, household services, and other household consumer goods; fuel (excluding firewood and dung); clothing and footwear; transport (excluding cost of purchased vehicles); communication; education; reading matter, cost of licenses and other rental charges, and cost of insurance.
Important categories of expenditures that I have excluded from the consumption aggregate are water; firewood and dung; health; imputed value of household durables; food consumption from home production; lobola/dowry, funerals, religious or traditional ceremonies, gambling; lumpy expenditures, such as furniture, appliances, vehicles, sound and video equipment, and so on. Below, I explain the construction (or the reason for exclusion) of some important components of the consumption expenditure.
C. Water, Firewood, and Dung
Water, firewood, and dung are items for which a significant percentage of households report no expenditures. However, we also know that households collect water and firewood and, hence, may consume them even though they report no expenditures on these items. To verify this, I have examined two questions from the LFS 2000:2 that ask the household if anyone has spent more than 1 hour in the past 7 days fetching water, wood, or dung. A significant percentage of households reported that they collected these items. In 2000, 97% of households with individuals who reported spending at least 1 hour collecting water reported no water expenditures; similarly, 89% of households that reported collecting firewood reported no firewood expenditures. Quality concerns aside, if two households consume the same amount of water (or firewood), but one household pays for it while the other collects it, including the expenditures on these items would bias the consumption aggregate in favor of people who are paying for them. A preferable option would be to impute value for use of water, firewood, and dung for households who collect it (and also possibly account for the opportunity cost of time spent on the activity), but there was no satisfactory way in which this could be done. So, I have opted to leave such expenditures out of the consumption aggregate.
19
D. Health, Lobola/Dowry, Funerals, Religious or Traditional Ceremonies, and Consumption of Durables Although lumpy expenditures are relatively large, they are usually infrequent, that is, only a small percentage of the households incur such expenditures during the recall period in a household survey. Including such expenditures would result in possibly overstating the welfare of households that incurred those expenditures during the recall period. Ideally, one would like to "smooth" these lumpy expenditures, but unfortunately I do not have the means to do this with the available data, and, hence, I leave them out of the consumption aggregate. Deaton and Zaidi (2002) make other arguments as to why one might choose to leave health expenditures out of a consumption aggregate, calling such expenditures "regrettable necessities." 20 In addition to being infrequent expenditures, lobolas/dowries can be thought of as transfers and, as such, are excluded from the aggregate.
Purchases of household durables also fall into the lumpy expenditures category, but in most welfare surveys it is possible to construct a "rental equivalent" for durable goods that are reported to be in the household's possession. However, to make such calculations I need not only information on the household assets but also data on when they were purchased, the value of the item when purchased, and so on. Unfortunately, these data are not available in the IES.
21
19 I have examined the importance of water expenditures in each year. Both the expenditure levels and budget shares are very small and look quite similar for each year-both on average and by expenditure quintiles. If water payments were included in the aggregate, their mean budget share would be 1.3% in 1995 and 1.1% in 2000. The monthly per capita amount spent on water payments by the bottom 60% of individuals was approximately R2 in both years. Table A4 in the appendix shows that while poor African households' access to water increased during this period, this was mainly due to increased access to water from public taps, which could be one reason the increased access does not seem to translate into reported water payments for the poor. Hence, the possibility remains that the real consumption of water increased between 1995 and 2000 in a propoor manner, but the expenditure data from the survey are not capturing this increase in consumption. In that case, I could still be overestimating the increase (or underestimating the decline) in poverty during this period. 20 For a more detailed discussion of this topic, please see Deaton and Zaidi (2002, 29-33) . If there was a change in the consumption of preventive medicine during this period, then the results may be biased depending on the direction of that change. 21 As a result of having to exclude the rental equivalent value of durable goods, I might overestimate or underestimate the extent of changes in poverty and inequality in South Africa over time, depending on whether households in different parts of the expenditure distribution accumulated
E. Housing
To derive the monetary value of the flow of services a household receives from occupying its dwelling, the obvious choice is to include the rent paid for that dwelling in the consumption aggregate (Deaton and Zaidi 2002, 35) . However, many households own the dwelling they live in or are given housing that is subsidized or free of charge by their employer or the government and, hence, do not pay rent. Most questionnaires ask such households how much they think they would be paying if they were renting their house. This implicit rental value can be used in consumption aggregates, if the information is deemed reliable. However, while this question was asked in the IES 1995, the module on housing changed slightly in IES 2000, and this question was omitted. In the absence of such data, I have decided to impute the rental value of houses based on housing characteristics (dwelling type, number of rooms, materials for roof and walls, etc.), access to services (electricity, water, sanitation, etc.), type of area (urban, farm, etc.) , and ownership of assets (radio, TV, car, and mobile phone). I ran a separate stepwise regression for each province in each year. 22 Using these regressions, rental expenditures were predicted for those households that did not pay rent for the dwellings they reside in. 23 assets or saw a depletion of them over this period. Table A7 in the appendix presents expenditures on a group of lumpy expenditures that were excluded from the consumption aggregate. The reader will note, e.g., that the purchase of a car or a refrigerator is a very rare event, especially for the poor. Expenditures on all the items presented are very small and, with the exception of funerals, not increasing over time. It is distressing to note that the percentage of individuals with positive spending on funerals increased by more than 50%, and expenditures on funerals almost doubled in the 5-year period following the end of the apartheid. 22 As there were not enough renters in the sample for Limpopo, I performed one regression for Limpopo and Mpumalanga provinces. The explanatory power in these regressions was more than satisfactory-the R 2 ranged from 0.47 to 0.66 in 2000 and 0.29 to 0.48 in 1995. Data on some of the household assets, mail delivery, and street lighting were not included in the 1995 survey and, hence, were not used in the regression models for that year. This partly explains why the average explanatory power of the regression models is lower in 1995. 23 The reader will note that, while I exclude water expenditures from the consumption aggregate, I include access to piped water as a regressor in the rental value regressions. One may ask whether water expenditures enter the consumption aggregate through the imputed rent variable. The answer, in this case, seems to be "no." If both "access to piped water" variables are omitted from the regressions, the average imputed rental value of housing remains the same (both overall and by various groupings, such as renters vs. owners), but the R 2 of these regressions are lower than those that include these variables. The reason is that access to piped water is correlated with other regressors, and its omission causes these other variables to pick up its effect on the rental value of housing. However, conditional on these other variables, piped water has some explanatory power, which affects the R 2 for each regression. As the average imputed value of housing is not higher with these variables than without (but it is more precise with than without), I conclude that "access to piped water" variables help capture the differences between housing values, but not differences in water consumption.
F. Poverty Lines, Spatial, and Intertemporal Price Adjustments
To draw normative poverty lines for this analysis, I use the "cost-of-basicneeds" method. This method stipulates a consumption bundle deemed to be adequate for basic consumption needs, and then estimates its cost for each province (Ravallion 2001) . The basic needs bundle is typically anchored to food-energy requirements consistent with common diets in the specific context. The food basket I have selected consists of the mean per capita quantities of each food item consumed by the third quintile of the (nominal) expenditure distribution in 2000. Using the nutritional value information for each food item obtained from the Medical Research Council (MRC) in South Africa, I calculated that this bundle would provide the average household with roughly 1,927 kilocalories per capita per day.
The IES 1995 and IES 2000 asked households about their expenditures for a large number of food and nonfood items for the past month or year but did not collect information on quantity purchased that would allow one to construct unit values. Nor did these surveys collect information on prices of various food items from the markets in the sampled communities. However, STATS SA has been collecting monthly price data for practically all the items in the food module of the IES surveys in metropolitan and urban areas of the nine South African provinces for some time. I used these prices from January 2001 to construct the average representative food bundle (for the third quintile of the expenditure distribution) in the IES 2000 and to price this bundle in each province. 24 With Western Cape as the numeraire (i.e., the price index in 2000 in Western Cape is 100), the ratio of the cost of the food bundle in each province to the cost in Western Cape gave us the Laspeyres food price index.
To derive the overall price index for 2000, I followed the methodology employed in Lanjouw et al. (1996) . I derived a housing price index by predicting the rental value of a house in an urban area that has four rooms, brick walls, a flush toilet, and access to electricity and street lighting in each province.
25 Again selecting Western Cape as the numeraire, I built a consumer housing price index by dividing the rental value of this house in each province by that in Western Cape. Finally, to derive a consumer price index for the remaining consumption items (i.e., nonfood, nonhousing components of the aggregate), I took a weighted average of the food and the housing price indexes, where the weights are the average budget shares of food and housing in total expenditures. A weighted average of these three price indexes-food, housing, and other nonfood-was then used to construct an overall spatial price index for the 2000 IES. Table A1 in the appendix presents the food, housing, and overall price indexes for 2000 by province.
The average representative bundle of the third quintile costs R180 in 2000 prices, and, as mentioned above, it provides 1,927 kilocalories per person. Using the average energy allowances recommended by the MRC, I calculated that the consumption in kilocalories recommended for an average South African household per capita is 2,261 (see table A3 for daily caloric requirements for South Africans by age for males and females). Linearly adjusting the R180 figure by 2,261/1,927, I arrive at a food poverty line ( ) of R211-the amount f Z necessary to purchase enough food to meet the basic daily food-energy requirements.
To derive the overall poverty line, I set a lower bound and an upper bound for cost-of-basic-needs poverty lines in South Africa, following Ravallion (1994, 119-25) . I calculate the mean nonfood expenditure of those households whose total consumption expenditures lie in small but increasing intervals around the food poverty line (e.g., from 0.99 to 1.01 , 0.98 to 1.02 , . . .,
95 to 1.05 ). The simple average of these mean nonfood expenditures f f Z Z plus the food poverty line yields a lower bound poverty line of R322. The basic idea here is that if a household's total expenditure is equal to the food poverty line, then any nonfood expenditure for that household must be absolutely necessary as the household is giving up basic food needs for those nonfood consumption goods. Using the same technique, but this time calculating the mean total expenditure of households whose food consumption expenditures are equal to the food poverty line, I derive an upper bound poverty line of R593.
26 If the basic needs norms that are anchored to food-energy requirements of South African households are deemed reasonable, then the poverty line for South Africa must lie between R322 and R593 in 2000 prices.
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26 The underlying assumption here is that once survival food needs are satisfied (to maintain bodily functions at rest), as total expenditure rises, basic nonfood needs will have to be satisfied before basic food needs. If, in addition, food and nonfood are normal goods once survival food needs are satisfied, then this assumption implies that the poverty line cannot exceed the total spending of those whose actual food spending achieves basic food needs. Consider a person whose food spending equals basic food needs. This person has reached the normative activity level underlying the food energy requirement. To have done so, she must have already acquired the basic nonfood goods which are prerequisite to that activity level in her society. So, whatever she spends on nonfood goods must exceed basic nonfood needs. 27 I also briefly discuss results using two more poverty lines: R87 and R174 per capita per month. These are equivalent to the commonly used international poverty lines of $1/day and $2/day, Finally, to incorporate the changes in price over time, that is, to inflate the consumption of the households in the 1995 IES, I used the provincial price indexes published monthly by STATS SA in their statistical releases titled "Consumer Price Index." However, the provincial indexes extend back to January 1997, leaving uncovered changes in overall prices by province for the year 1996. To derive a spatial price index for 1995, I assumed that the change in prices in each province between January 1996 and January 1997 was the same as the annual change in the average prices in the 4-year period of January 1997-January 2001 in that province. Then, using the spatial price index in 2000 and the changes in prices between January 1996 and January 2001 in each province, I calculated the spatial price index for households in the October 1995 IES. Finally, the real consumption of each household in 1995 prices was then converted to real consumption in 2000 prices by scaling it up by the change in prices in the province. The provincial price index for 1995 (in 2000 prices) along with the change in overall prices between 1995 and 2000 is presented in the appendix, table A1.
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The data used in this analysis have three possible shortcomings that might bias the results presented below. First, the issue of sampling weights for the 1995 and 2000 IES data has been a source of much controversy. Because of problems with the sampling frame for the 1995 OHS and IES, I report results using a set of sampling weights that was recalculated by STATS SA using information from the 1996 population census.
29 Second, the IES lack the necessary information to impute a comparable value for consumption of homegrown products. In many countries, consumption of home-grown products is a significant component of the household consumption aggregate, and, hence, its omission can lead to poverty being overestimated and the cross-sectional and intertemporal poverty profiles to be biased. 30 Third, the IES neither collects information on quantities purchased to allow the construction of unit values nor on prices of various food items in the markets in the communities sampled.
adjusted for purchasing power parity. The $2/day poverty line is close to that used by Deaton (1997) , and the food poverty line of R211 described above. In this sense, the $2/day poverty line can be thought of as an extreme poverty line. 28 Food prices are generally very similar across South Africa. Housing estimates are more varied, with the most expensive housing in Western Cape, Kwazulu-Natal, and Gauteng and the cheapest in Northern Cape and Limpopo. Overall price changes during the 1995-2000 period show little variation by province, ranging from 27% in Western Cape to 35% in Mpumalanga. 29 The 1991 population census, which was the sampling frame for the 1995 OHS and IES (and for the widely used SALDRU survey), was carried out under the apartheid regime and had marked coverage problems. 30 For example, Deaton and Zaidi (2002) report that food consumption from home production accounts for 35% of the consumption aggregate in Nepal in 1996 and 21% in Ghana in 1988-89. Hence, the price data I utilize to transform nominal household expenditures into real expenditures come from the consumer price surveys that STATS SA conducts on a monthly basis. The consumer price survey covers only metropolitan and urban areas throughout the nine provinces of South Africa. The lack of rural price data may cause an overestimation of poverty in rural areas, as well as biases in intertemporal comparisons. For each of the potential problems discussed above, I perform sensitivity analysis and report the results in Section IV. Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for per capita expenditure in 1995 and 2000. The four vertical lines at R87, R174, R322, and R593 refer to the $1/day, $2/day, lower-bound, and upper-bound poverty lines, respectively. The CDF for 1995 starts below that for 2000 and stays below it up to R275 before crossing it. Using the normative lower-bound poverty line of R322 per month, we find that at least 58% of the South African population was poor in both years. The small positive expenditure growth was statistically insignificant. As the CDFs for the 2 years cross each other, there is no first-order dominance, and, hence, it is not possible to make a definitive statement about changes in poverty for all poverty lines and all poverty mea- sures.
III. Results

A. Absolute Poverty
31 Figure 2 plots the area under the poverty incidence curves for per capita household expenditures between the two normative poverty lines. These curves, sometimes called "poverty deficit curves," do not cross each other, indicating second-order dominance below R593. This means that for no poverty line below the upper-bound poverty line was poverty lower in 2000 for any poverty measure with . In fact, the calculations show statistically a 1 0 significant increases for any poverty line below R200 for the poverty headcount index, for all lines up to R350 for the poverty gap index, and for those below R550 for the squared poverty gap index. Figure 3 shows the cumulative distribution functions by year and racial group. A couple of observations are worth noting. First, in both 1995 and 2000, poverty is virtually zero among whites, and Africans are the poorest group, followed by coloureds and Asians-closely mimicking the order established by the apartheid regime. There is first-order dominance for all CDFs between racial groups. The gap between coloureds and Africans increased over this period, while the gap between coloureds and the remaining population groups decreased. Second, figure 3 also demonstrates that the CDFs for Africans looks (not surprisingly, as they make up more than three-quarters of the total population) very similar to the CDFs for all South Africa in figure 1, indicating that, while some Africans made gains in their household expenditures over time, many others have experienced losses. However, Africans are the only population group that exhibits this pattern. For example, the CDF in 2000 for coloureds lies nowhere above that in 1995, meaning that poverty among them is lower in 2000 for any poverty line. We find much more modest (and mostly insignificant) improvements for Asians and whites.
Changes in overall poverty, and by population group, are also presented for the lower-bound poverty line in table 1. In 2000, more than two-thirds of Africans in South Africa lived in poverty, while more than 40% lived with less than $2/day. However, the substantial improvements in mean expenditures for coloureds resulted in a significant decrease in poverty. The poverty headcount among this group went down from 50% in 1995 to 35% in 2000. There was no change for Asians and whites; that is, the headcount rate remained at a very low level for Asians and at virtually zero for whites. Table 2 presents the changes in poverty for the nine provinces of South Africa. There is substantial variation in levels and changes in poverty across provinces. The only provinces that have experienced significant growth in their mean household expenditure levels-Western Cape, Northern Cape, and Free State-have had significant declines in poverty. In fact, by 2000, Western Cape had the lowest poverty headcount rate in South Africa, replacing Gauteng. That Western Cape and Northern Cape are also the two provinces in which coloureds form the majority of the population is consistent with the significant reduction in poverty coloureds experienced. However, it was not just coloureds who benefited from poverty reduction in these provinces-the poverty headcount among Africans went down from 75% to 62% in Northern Cape and from 62% to 55% in Western Cape. While a few provinces made progress, a number of provinces have seen dramatic increases in poverty. In Eastern Cape, already the poorest province in South Africa in 1995, the poverty gap and poverty severity have gotten significantly worse, while the percentage of people living with less than $2/day increased from 49% to 56%. Limpopo, mainly a rural province, has seen the most dramatic increase in its poverty incidence, with approximately threequarters of its population in poverty by 2000, compared with 65% in 1995. Poverty has also increased in Kwazulu-Natal, where close to half of the population lived with less than $2/day by 2000. 32 Finally Gauteng, the wealthiest province in 1995, has experienced large increases in poverty, where more than one-third of the population lived in poverty by 2000, up from less than a quarter 5 years prior to that.
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Some of the dramatic increases in extreme poverty happened in provinces where mean expenditure levels stayed constant over time. In Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal, the increase in poverty is due to a worsening of the distribution of expenditures. But in Northwest Province and Mpumalanga, where growth rates were also zero, poverty stayed constant. Given this variation in outcomes regarding consumption growth and poverty, in the next two subsections, I will examine whether the changes in South Africa's distribution of household expenditures have been pro-poor for some and describe the changes in inequality.
B. Pro-poor Growth
Figures 4 and 5 present growth incidence curves (GIC) for South Africa and for the coloured population, respectively, for the period 1995-2000. The GIC is obtained by plotting the annual growth rate in each percentile, p (varied from 0 to 1), of the distribution of per capita expenditures. 34 The area under the GIC up to the headcount index in 1995 (normalized by the headcount rate in 1995) gives the mean growth rate for the poor. The vertical line in the graph indicates the headcount rate in 1995, while the horizontal line denotes the mean percentile growth rate. I define growth to be "absolutely pro-poor" if the mean growth rate for the poor is positive, and "relatively propoor" if, in addition, the mean growth rate for the poor is greater than or equal to the growth rate in mean expenditure. Hence, "absolute pro-poor growth" requires only that the poor be better off on average in absolute terms, 32 This increase is consistent with the results reported in Carter and May (2001) on changes in poverty in Kwazulu-Natal for 1993-98. 33 There is reason to believe that the sampling problems that plagued the 1995 survey were the most severe in Gauteng, leading to an undercount of the population there, especially Africans. Hence, part of the increase in poverty in Gauteng during this period may be due to an underestimation of poverty in 1995. Another factor likely to be contributing to this increase is migration to Gauteng from poorer provinces after 1994. According to the 2001 population census, the population of Gauteng increased by 20% between 1996 and 2001, a growth rate that is twice as large as that of South Africa as a whole. I discuss these issues further in Sec. IV. 34 It is important to remember that the households in the same percentile in two different periods need not be the same, i.e., these percentiles are "anonymous." See Ravallion and Chen (2003) for a detailed discussion of growth incidence curves and pro-poor growth. while "relative pro-poor growth" requires the distributional shifts to be propoor as well.
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A GIC that lies above zero for each percentile implies first-order dominance 35 For example, Ravallion and Chen (2003) report that the rate of pro-poor growth in China is 3.9% between 1990 and 1999, while the growth rate in the mean is 6.2%, an example of what I define as "absolute pro-poor growth." However, for 1993-96, the same figures were 10% and 8.2%, respectively, i.e., growth during this period was "relatively pro-poor." of the expenditure distribution in 2000 over 1995, that is, an unambiguous decline in poverty. A GIC that is downward sloping implies that the poor benefit from growth more than the nonpoor, leading to a decrease in inequality. Unfortunately, the GIC for South Africa during this period ( fig. 4 ) satisfies neither condition: it is below zero almost everywhere for the poor and upward sloping over most of the range. The annual growth rate of the mean per capita household expenditures is 0.5%, while the rate of pro-poor growth is Ϫ1.4%. Hence, the modest growth in South Africa has not been pro-poor between 1995 and 2000-either absolutely or relatively.
Because the poverty headcount has dropped sharply among coloureds, it is informative to contrast the GIC for coloureds with that for the whole country. Figure 5 shows that the GIC for coloureds lies entirely above the zero line and the rate of pro-poor growth is 4.8%. However, the GIC is again upward sloping, meaning that the nonpoor benefited more from growth than the poor and inequality within coloureds has risen. The growth of the mean per capita household expenditures for coloureds is 6.8%. Hence, growth has been only "absolutely pro-poor" for coloureds. The same pattern (not shown here) also holds for the three provinces with significant poverty reduction.
Growth has not been pro-poor in South Africa as a whole, and in the instances when poverty declined for certain subgroups the distributional shifts were still not pro-poor. As a result, one expects inequality to have somewhat increased. I describe the changes in inequality below. Figure 6 plots the Lorenz curves for 1995 and 2000. The Lorenz curve for 2000 is below that for 1995 for most of the distribution, but they intersect around the 85th percentile. Hence, it is not possible to state that any inequality measure which satisfies anonymity and the Pigou-Dalton transfer principles will register an increase in 2000. Table 3 shows the changes in inequality in South Africa as a whole as well as the changes by population group and type of area, using three inequality measures: the Gini index, mean log deviation, and the Theil index. 36 In South Africa as a whole, only the increase in mean log deviation was statistically significant. This is not unexpected, as the mean log deviation is a general entropy class measure of inequality that is sensitive 36 Mean log deviation and the Theil index are general entropy class measures of inequality, which satisfy five key axioms, namely, the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, income scale independence, principle of population, anonymity, and decomposability. By contrast, the Gini index fails the Decomposability axiom. The definition for mean log deviation is , while that for the f log (my ) to changes at the bottom end of the distribution. The Gini index stayed around 0.57 between 1995 and 2000. However, there was a significant increase in inequality among the African population-figure 7 shows that the 1995 distribution of expenditures Lorenz dominates that of 2000 up to the 98th percentile. During this 5-year period, the Gini index among Africans increased by more than 3 percentage points to 0.50, the mean log deviation went up from 0.37 to 0.44, and these changes were statistically significant. Changes in inequality among other groups were insignificant during this period.
C. Inequality
General entropy class inequality measures are decomposable into components of inequality within and between groups, and the mean log deviation is decomposed as follows:
where j refers to subgroups, refers to the population share of group j, and g j refers to inequality in group j. The between-group component of inequality I j is captured by the first term to the right of the equality sign. This term can be interpreted as measuring what would be the level of inequality in the population if everyone within the group had the same (the group-mean) consumption level, . The second term on the right reflects what would be the m j overall inequality level if there were no differences in mean consumption across groups but each group had its actual within-group inequality, . I j Table 4 shows the results for such a decomposition exercise for South Africa, where the subgroups are the four major population groups. We find that the share of inequality between population groups went down from 38.3% in 1995 to 33.2% in 2000. However, this decrease in the share of between-group inequality can be attributed mostly to the increase in inequality within the African population, as between-group inequality decreased only slightly over the same period-owing to the relative progress made by coloureds in their level of mean per capita household expenditure. 37 37 Elbers et al. (2005) propose an alternative measure of between-group inequality, which is the observed between-group inequality as a share of maximum possible between-group inequality when the number and size of the groups are fixed. Using their measure, I find that inequality between South Africa's four major population groups actually increased from 52.9% in 1995 to 56.4% in 2000. If we examine inequality between whites and nonwhites in 2000, we find that it accounts for 80% of the maximum between-group inequality attainable between two groups with the same relative sizes (up from 65% in 1995). Examining inequality between various groupings of the population, Elbers et al. (2005) argue that the differences within nonwhites (or the further ethnic, 
IV. Sensitivity Analysis
A. Sampling Weights
Throughout this article, I use a set of sampling weights for the 1995 data that were recalculated by STATS SA based on information from the 1996 population census. However, the sampling weights in the 2000 IES may also be problematic, in that they seem to lead to an overestimation (underestimation) in the population share of Africans (whites). Following the end of apartheid, internal migration and emigration might have led to rapid shifts in demographic composition in South Africa, possibly making the 1996 popor language, differences within the African population for that matter) are much less important in understanding inequality in South Africa than simply those between the whites and nonwhites. They argue that if a policy maker were concerned with racial income inequality in South Africa, it would make much more sense to view the population as composed of whites and nonwhites, rather than focusing on the differences between various ethnic groups within the African population. For more detail on this alternative perspective, see Elbers et al. (2005) . SA 2003) confirms that this may be true to some extent. Table 5 shows that the share of whites is underestimated significantly in the IES (9.6% vs. 7.7%), and this is particularly true in Gauteng (19.9% vs. 13.0%). 38 If the census figures in 2001 are better in representing the 2000 population, this bias could lead to an underestimation of the growth rate and an overestimation of the increases in poverty described above.
To test the robustness of the results, I employ a crude ex post reweighting scheme. 39 Using population shares from the 2001 census at the province level for each racial group, I reweight my 2000 IES sample so that the population share in each of the 36 province/race cells (nine provinces times four racial groups) is identical to that from the 2001 census. The reestimated welfare measures are presented in table 6 for the $2/day (R174) and the lower-bound (R322) poverty lines. Using the adjusted weights, mean expenditure grows from R534 to R587 over this period, a per capita growth rate of 1.9% per year. This is more than double the GDP growth rate, and as such it can be treated as an upper limit on growth of per capita household expenditures over this period.
Despite this expenditure growth, the effect of reweighting on poverty changes is minimal. None of the main conclusions drawn using the original sampling weights for 2000 are reversed using the adjusted sampling weights. 40 However, inequality is higher using these adjusted sampling weights. These results are not completely surprising. As the population share of whites-who are clustered at the top end of the expenditure distribution-is significantly 38 At the same time, it is worth noting that the sampling weights I utilize for the 1995 IES produce very similar numbers to the 1996 census (table 5, cols. 2 and 3). 39 Introducing ex post inflation factors into surveys in this way is not uncommon. See, e.g., Deaton (1997) . 40 However, in a couple of cases the increases in poverty become statistically insignificant after reweighting the 2000 sample. higher than originally estimated by the IES alone, the rate of growth and the level of inequality increase, but poverty levels are not significantly affected. While the results with respect to changes in poverty and inequality generally hold regardless of the sampling weights used in the analysis, the magnitudes of some of these changes are different. For example, using the adjusted weights for 2000, the headcount index for Gauteng still increases significantly but only to 33.8% instead of 36.8%. I conclude that adjustments to sampling weights alone cannot reverse the main conclusions reached in this article.
B. Consumption from Home-Grown Production
The importance of consumption from home-grown production seems to be small in South Africa compared with other countries. Deaton and Zaidi (2002) report that the budget share of this item was 2.2% in South Africa in 1993, compared with 6.7% in Brazil or 16.8% in Vietnam. I have obtained the South Africa Integrated Household Survey (SAIHS) for 1993-the same data set used by Deaton and Zaidi-and replicated this figure myself. Further examination of these data revealed no significant differences in the share of consumption from home-grown production across per capita expenditure deciles.
To examine whether this pattern has significantly changed over time, I calculated the share of maize consumption from home-grown production using the data sets for 1995 and 2000.
41 I use the market price of maize in each province to value home consumption. We find that, while only 3% of the population was consuming maize from their own production in 1995, this figure went up to approximately 11% by 2000. The share of maize consumption from home production in the consumption aggregate also increased from approximately 0.5% in 1995 to roughly 1.5% by 2000. Furthermore, by 2000, home-grown maize consumption constituted 3% of the poorest quintile's consumption and virtually none of the richest quintile's, suggesting that home production of food may have become more important for the poor over this period.
However, these figures are still very small. Table 7 compares the poverty figures for 2000 using a consumption aggregate that includes home-grown maize (col. 5) with those without this consumption item for 1995 (col. 3) and 2000 (col. 4). While poverty (and inequality) is slightly less in 2000 when this consumption of homegrown maize is accounted for, the changes in the poverty gap and squared poverty gap measures over this period remain significant. The general conclusions regarding intertemporal comparisons of the mean growth rate, poverty, and inequality are robust to the inclusion of homegrown food products. This conclusion remains the same regardless of whether I use the published sampling weights in the IES 2000 or the adjusted ones discussed above.
C. Rural/Urban Price Differentials
Data on rural prices in South Africa are poor. As mentioned before, the IES data do not allow the calculation of unit values, and there are no community price surveys. To get a basic idea of the rural/urban food price differentials, I again draw from the SAIHS of 1993. I fix a food bundle that makes up roughly 80% of the food consumption in the 2000 IES and use the mean national urban and rural prices of these items from the SAIHS community questionnaire 41 Among the home-grown products for which data are collected, maize is by far the most important item grown and consumed by households in my surveys. to construct crude rural and urban price indexes for South Africa. 42 We find that the cost of this bundle in urban areas is approximately 4.5% higher than that in rural areas in 1993. This difference would lead to a slight overestimation of poverty in South Africa in general and the relative poverty of rural households in particular. 43 There are no data available that can shed light on whether this small 42 This bundle includes mealie meal/maize flour, rice, bread, beef, mutton, pork, lamb, potatoes, tomatoes, cabbage, soft drinks, milk, milk powder, eggs, vegetable oil, margarine, butter, and sugar. 43 In this article, I chose not to break down the South African population into urban and rural areas for the analysis of poverty and inequality. It does seem that STATS SA has made changes to the definitions that determine what types of enumeration areas are considered urban or nonurban between 1995 and 2000. However, the sensitivity analysis here does not suffer from this change as it simply utilizes a baseline urban-rural price differential from 1993 and hypothetical changes in this differential over time.
difference has changed between 1995 and 2000. 44 However, there is evidence from other countries on divergence of price indexes between urban and rural areas. For instance, Friedman and Levinsohn (2002) report a co-movement of rural and urban prices in Indonesia over a 12-year period between 1984 and 1996.
45 Deaton and Tarozzi (2000) report that urban prices were 11.4% higher than rural prices in India in 1987-88 and that this difference increased to 15.6% by 1993-94. These numbers do not suggest a large divergence in rural/ urban price differentials over time.
There are yet other factors to suggest that the small rural/urban price differentials are not likely to affect the results significantly. According to information collected on the area of purchase of goods and services in the 2000 IES, households in rural areas report buying a significant amount of food items and most of their nonfood items in nearby urban areas. 46 Nonetheless, I simulate the effect of changes in the urban/rural price differential over time and report the results in table 8. I present revised poverty and inequality figures under three hypothetical scenarios: that the base rural/urban price differential increased from a reasonable 5% in 1995 to 10%, 15%, or 20% in 2000. Note that, if I had assumed a 5% price differential between urban and rural areas in 1995, the poverty figures would not be significantly lower than those reported in Section III. The table also shows that the increase in various FGT measures of poverty between 1995 and 2000 become insignificant only if the rural/urban price differential quadrupled in the 5-year period between 1995 and 2000 (cols. 4-6).
D. What Do Other Data Sources Tell Us?
In this section thus far, I tried to test the sensitivity of the results to various assumptions about sampling weights, consumption categories excluded from the aggregate and spatial cost-of-living differences. I found that reasonable adjustments in each of these categories do not reverse the results presented in this article so far. Sensitivity analysis of this kind made use of the same data sets employed for this study, namely, the IES 1995 and 2000. However, one can look at other data sources that also provide some evidence on consumption growth and poverty for the period 1995-2000. Here, I would first like to present two pieces of such evidence that support the findings of this article.
47
As mentioned in Section I, South Africa's growth record was, for the period under examination here, below expectations. Data from the quarterly bulletin of the South African Reserve Bank show that the total "final consumption expenditure by households" grew by approximately 3% per year between 1995 47 There are, of course, other data sources as well. For example, a recent paper by Van der Berg et al. (2005) explores income trends between 1993 and 2004 using the all media and products surveys combined with data from national accounts. The results they report for the period 1993-2000, a small increase in poverty and a slight decline of incomes at the bottom end of the distribution, are broadly consistent with the findings presented here. They also report significant declines in poverty for the period 2000-2004. and 2000. 48 Census figures from STATS SA put the annual population growth rate in South Africa at exactly 2%. 49 This puts South Africa's growth rate (of its final household consumption expenditure) at approximately 1%. Even if one estimates that the annual growth rate of the South African population was smaller-say, 1%-South Africa grew at best at a 2% clip per capita over this period. In comparison, using household survey data to carefully construct comparable expenditure aggregates in this study, we find that the annual per capita growth rate of per capita household expenditures is 0.5%.
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There is one other data source in South Africa that provides independent evidence on household incomes and expenditures: the KIDS panel data. The study reinterviewed the (nonwhite) households in the Kwazulu-Natal province, who were originally part of a nationally representative sample of nearly 9000 households in the Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development in 1993.
51 Using a household subsistence poverty line, Carter and May (2001) find that poverty in Kwazulu-Natal increased from 26.8% in 1995 to 42.5% in 1998. Restricting the data to the nonwhite population in Kwazulu-Natal, we find that a poverty line of R152 (per capita per month in 2000 prices) gives us roughly the same poverty headcount rate of 27.1% in 1995-the base year. Using this poverty line, we find that poverty in Kwazulu-Natal increased to 42.1% by 2000, almost identical to the finding of Carter and May (2001) . The cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) reproduced from Carter and May and those constructed using the data are presented in the appendix, figures A1 and A2. It is hard to tell the two figures apart. May (2001, 1995) state that the 1993 and 1998 CDFs "cross at about the 80th percentile where measured expenditures are about 250% of subsistence needs." The CDFs for Kwazulu-Natal from the study cross at 79%, where monthly per capita expenditure is R445-293% of the poverty line of R152.
However, there is one source that, while somewhat similar in its qualitative findings (i.e., a larger decline of incomes for the bottom half of the distribution), arrives at quite a different conclusion in magnitude. Leibbrandt et al. (2005) , using the same surveys that were analyzed in this article but using individual income data for individuals 18 and older, report that real individual incomes 48 The annual growth rate was almost identical for the period 1996-2001. This latter period may be deemed to be the more relevant one for our purposes here, as the IES data were collected around October both in 1995 and 2000. 49 According to Census 2001 at a Glance (STATS SA), the population of South Africa was 40.6 million in 1996 and 44.8 million in 2001. 50 The careful reader will also note that, in Sec. IV, an adjustment to the sampling weights used in the analysis yields an upper bound of 1.9% annual growth in per capita household expenditures. 51 For more detail on the KIDS data, see May et al. (2000) and Carter and May (2001) . declined on the order of 40% (or about 7% per year), which they themselves call a "seismic shift." It is important to point out that their choice of welfare indicator, individual income, is different from the per capita household expenditure used here and, hence, is not suitable for a rigorous comparison. Nevertheless, the difference is still somewhat puzzling.
One obvious fact to note is that this large decline in incomes is very much out of line with growth data from national accounts, which I reported above. Leibbrandt et al. (2005) choose to remain silent on this discrepancy, implying that the national accounts data must be wrong, rather than the survey income data.
52 However, Van der Berg et al. (2005) note that such a drop in incomes would imply a worse shock to South African output than that experienced during the Great Depression. Citing various evidence that one would assume would accompany such a drop in real individual incomes (such as petrol sales, electricity production, tax revenues, and expenditures on various durable goods), they conclude that "it appears implausible that household incomes declined to the extent suggested by the researchers' analysis of raw survey data."
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V. Conclusion
This article assesses the changes in poverty and inequality in South Africa for 1995-2000, the period that covers the first 5 years after the official end of apartheid in 1994. Consistent with GDP growth, we find that there was little growth in per capita household expenditures during this period. The headcount index remained unchanged for a large range of poverty lines and roughly 60% of all South Africans, and two-thirds of the African population, were poor in either year using the (normative) lower-bound poverty line of R322 per capita per month in 2000 prices. The poverty gap (squared poverty gap) index significantly increased for any poverty line below R350 (R550) as a result of declining expenditures at the bottom end of the expenditure distribution, and inequality among Africans rose sharply. By 2000, approximately one in 10 South Africans were living with less than $1/day and one in three with less than $2/day, figures that represent a statistically significant increase from 1995. 52 They also note that their results are transparent and replicable. 53 While it is usually not a good idea to compare results using income data with those using household expenditures, such comparisons seem to be particularly problematic in South Africa. An analysis of income and expenditure data from the KIDS panel surveys for 1993 and 1998 finds an annual increase in mean income at an approximately 3% rate, while household expenditure data from the same data sets indicate an annual decline of roughly 4.5% (Ö zler 2003) . These large discrepancies in growth trends in income and expenditure within two independent data sources in South Africa are puzzling, and the issue deserves an examination on its own. Attempts at reconciling income and expenditure data within the IES 1995 and 2000 are beyond the scope of this article. Some puzzles remain. First, what explains the divergent paths taken by the African and the coloured populations? The substantial decline in poverty experienced by the coloureds is consistent with the finding that Western Cape and Northern Cape-the two provinces where coloureds form the majority of the population-also saw their poverty rates decline significantly during this period. The fact that African residents of these provinces also benefited from these reductions in poverty, suggests a geographic rather than an ethnic explanation for this change, although I cannot provide any evidence as to whether there was a common underlying cause for poverty reduction in these areas for both population groups, or some positive spillover effects of the gains by the coloureds for Africans.
Second, what explains the losses at the bottom end of the distribution? The reasons behind these changes are complex and warrant examination in a separate paper. However, using preliminary results from such an exploration, we find that the losses are mainly due to changes in the returns to individuals' endowments. 54 Labor force participation increased significantly during this period, especially for African women, and in urban areas. In an atmosphere of few new jobs, it is possible that the new entrants with lower skills and experience have put a downward pressure on wages in the economy. 55 An indicator of job displacement is an increase in the education levels of the unemployed and a similar decrease in that for the employed. On the demographic side, the percentage of female-headed households was higher in 2000. It seems that there were more women without the necessary education or skills in the labor market in 2000 than there were in 1995. 56 One possible explanation for this demographic shift in the labor market could be the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, which affects the African population in South Africa more than any other population group. Adult mortality (or morbidity) leads to the loss of assets and income earners, consistent with causing other adults in the family, sometimes women who have never participated in the labor force before, to seek work outside the home.
While substantial progress was made in other areas, such as access to safe water and sanitation, or coverage for social transfers like the old-age pension program, the government's macroeconomic strategy failed to generate the 54 Leibbrandt et al. (2005) also examine this question using household income data. 55 Two-thirds of the new entrants were African females and roughly three-quarters were in urban areas. The analysis shows that there were three main groups of new entrants into the labor market over this period: young (ages 15-24) educated migrants (ages 25-34) to urban areas, and older females (age 45 and older). A combination of lower education, experience, and possible lower wages for females in the labor market may have caused the leftward shift in the wage distribution. 56 Casale (2004) also notes the feminization of the labor market in South Africa. projected growth and create enough jobs to bring down the high rate of unemployment. Even if the projected growth rates were achieved, it should not be assumed that substantial reductions in poverty would follow. Without a progressive shift in the expenditure distribution, even if South Africa grew at a remarkable annual rate of 8% per capita-similar to China's growth rate in the 1990s-it would take approximately 10 years for the average poor household to escape poverty. 57 South Africa needs to grow in a way that also improves the distribution of incomes if it is to make significant progress against poverty in the short to medium run. 
